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THE CONSTITUTION AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
ARTHUR

M.

SCHLESINGER, JR.*

This has been the year in which Americans have joyously
marked the bicentennial of our Constitution. It has been a grand
celebration, but I must confess that I have reflected once or twice
during this festive time that we are prepared to do almost anything
for our sacred document-except to read it.
For the indication is that many of us have only the dimmest idea
what is in it. A poll taken in February of this year by the Hearst
Corporation reports that seven out of ten Americans believe that
the Constitution declares that "all men are created equal"-an ennobling sentiment but not to be found in the Constitution. Nearly
half of those polled think it contains the phrase "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need"-a result that would
have considerably gratified Karl Marx. Sixty-four percent think the
Constitution establishes English as our national language. Fortynine percent, almost half, think that the President has the authority
to suspend the Constitution in times of national emergency. Some
of our recent Presidents seem to be part of that forty-nine percent.
If this poll can be trusted-and I am always skeptical when
1,004 Americans are polled, and the pollsters tell us that this is what
240 million Americans think-then we must conclude that we have
not done right by our Constitution. For the American Constitution,
whether or not it is, as Gladstone famously said, "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of
man," is beyond all question an extraordinary achievement. It is
not a perfect document, as Justice Thurgood Marshall powerfully
pointed out the other day.2 "We the People" in the Constitution's
preamble turns out to mean in the text: "We the white adult
males." Women and slaves were beyond the fringe. Yet one of the
wonders of the Constitution is that it provides the means for its own
improvement. Amendment and judicial interpretation have corrected many of its flaws and extended its basic principles.
* Albert Schweitzer Chair in the Humanities, The Graduate School and University
Center, City University of New York. A.B., Harvard College, 1938.
1. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, N. AM. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1878, at 185.
2. T. Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and
Trademark Law Association in Maui, Hawaii (May 6, 1987) (available at the Varvland
Law Review).
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What a document it is! It was drawn up two hundred years ago
by fifty-five men for less than four million people-hardly half the
population of New York City today-living in thirteen small states
straggled along the Atlantic seaboard. It has survived with minimal
changes (twenty-six amendments, only sixteen since 1791) while the
United States has grown into a continental, industrial, and now
global power, with forty times the land area and sixty times the population of 1787. It is the oldest written constitution in continuous
operation in the world-a very considerable accomplishment, when
one reflects that Brazil, for example, has had eight constitutions in
its 165 years of independence and is now drafting its ninth, and that
even so politically mature a nation as France has had four constitutions in the last century.
Why has the American Constitution so marvelously endured?
Its longevity is a tribute to the wisdom of the men who drafted it
during that hot Philadelphia summer so long ago. They were men
well read in the history of classical republics; men experienced in
colonial assemblies and state governments; practical men prepared
to make concessions and compromises to form a more perfect
union; visionary men who took the long view and believed that they
were writing not for the hour but for the ages (as Madison told the
convention on June 26, 1787: "In framing a system which we wish
to last for ages, we should not lose sight of the changes which ages
will produce");3 skeptical men with no illusions about human nature
(Lord Bryce described the Constitution in The American Commonwealth as "based on the theology of Calvin and the philosophy of
Hobbes ... the work of men who believed in original sin, and were
resolved to leave open for transgressors no door which they could
possibly shut");4 men determined to end the confusions of the Articles of Confederation by establishing a strong central government
with a strong Presidency and equally determined to make sure that
power could not be abused and that the strong central government
and the strong Presidency would remain forever accountable to the
people.
To strengthen accountability they devised a system based on
the separation of powers. The separation of powers means the distribution of the powers of the national government among three distinct and coordinate branches-the executive, the legislative, and
the judiciary. The theory of the framers was that each branch would
3. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION
STATES 280 (C. Tansill ed. 1927).
4. 1 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 299 (1888).

OF THE AMERICAN
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serve as a check on the other two, thereby assuring the accountability of government and the liberties of the people. This system of
"checks and balances" was designed, in the words of Justice Brandeis, "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbi'5
trary power.

This separation of powers was the idea that Hamilton placed
first in his list of those "wholly new discoveries" in the "science of
politics" that might enable the risky American experiment to escape
6
the melancholy fate that had overtaken the republics of antiquity.
The separation of powers was a novelty in constitutionalism in 1787.
For that matter, it is still something of a novelty today. Foreigners
find the whole concept hard to grasp. When I visited Beijing a short
while ago, a cabinet minister said to me that he utterly failed to understand the American system--"the system of three governments."
Even those reared under a parliamentary system are baffled.
The parliamentary system is characteristically based not on the separation but on the fusion of powers. Thus, in Great Britain Parliament creates the Executive (in the sense that the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet are drawn from Parliament) and exercises the final judicial power. The framers rejected this model. They turned down the
proposal that Congress choose the President, providing rather for
election by the people through an electoral college. They established an independent federal judiciary holding office for life.
The system of accountability thus depends on the maintenance
of a balance among the three separate and coordinate branches of
government. The framers were well aware of what Madison called
the "impossibility and inexpediency" of a rigid separation of powers
into three watertight compartments. Madison devoted two of The
FederalistPapers to showing that the Constitution envisaged "a partial
mixture of powers." 7 Hamilton described the situation with regard
to vital powers as one of 'joint possession." ' In our own day, Professor Neustadt has accurately described the constitutional plan as
one of "separated institutions sharing powers." 9 As Justice Jackson
put it in his great concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case:
"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty,
it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers
5. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 51 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 328; No. 48, at 338 (J. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 506 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
9. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 101 (rev. ed.
1976) (footnote omitted).
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into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches not separateness but interdependence, not autonomy but reciprocity."'"
Nevertheless, a system of divided powers, designed for the restraint of power rather than for efficiency in its application, does
create problems. Today high-minded and capable citizens wonder
whether the time has not come for a fresh look at the Constitution.
Why, after all, should anyone expect that a document drawn up for a
small, rural society remote from world power conflicts would be a
perfect fit two centuries later for a mighty imperial power? However
effective the Constitution may have been in addressing our
problems during the relatively placid nineteenth century, it no
longer-so the contention runs-meets our needs in the dark and
bloody twentieth century.
So in recent years we have seen a campaign for constitutional
reform. Some reformers concentrate on particular issues: a single
six-year term for the President; direct election of the President;
four-year terms for the House and eight-year terms for the Senate;
members of Congress serving in the Cabinet; an item veto; an annually balanced budget; prohibition of abortion; and so on. But the
gravamen of the case against the Constitution of 1787 lies in an indictment of the distinctive feature of the American polity-the separation of powers.
Let me quote the formulation offered by the Committee on the
Constitutional System, a group of able persons experienced in government, politics, and academia, co-chaired by three distinguished
Americans-Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum of Kansas; Douglas
Dillon, the former Secretary of the Treasury; and Lloyd Cutler, a
former counsel to the President. The Committee puts the problem
in these terms: "The checks and balances inspired by the experience of the eighteenth century have led repeatedly, in the twentieth
century, to governmental stalemate and deadlock, to an incapacity
to make quick and sharp decisions in the face of urgent
problems."''
This situation, it is argued, is devastating enough in domestic
policy, where it prevents concerted action by the executive and legislative branches to deal with the budget deficit, the trade deficit, the
public debt, and other agonizing questions. And, as some continue
10. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,J.,
concurring).
11. COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, AFTER Two CENTURIES: OUR
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IN TODAY'S COMPLEX WORLD 3 (Feb. 1,
1983) (Basic Policy Statement).
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the indictment, it is disastrous in foreign policy. We are engaged in
a global struggle with an unscrupulous adversary free to act without
regard to internal opinion or international law. Can we let the Constitution tie our hands and thereby imperil the safety and survival of
the Republic? Does not national security require the concentration
of authority in the hands of the President, since he has the best information and alone can act with the necessary secrecy and dispatch? Can we afford congressional meddling with the conduct of
foreign affairs? Can we afford 535 Secretaries of State? Does not
indeed the very existence of this obsolete system of checks and balances force Presidents into circumvention and illegality, as we have
seen in recent months, in their patriotic desire to protect the
Republic?
A British observer recently summed up the case.
The Iranian arms sale fiasco and its impact on "Contra"
forces on the borders of Nicaragua have made it clear yet
again that the American constitutional system is an obstacle to the conduct of a successful Western security policy.
More particularly, it deprives U.S. administrations of most
of those unconventional tools which great powers have always had to use in a cruel world .... It is this self-inflicted
American inhibition, and not the Soviet menace alone, that
now threatens to engulf us all in some future disaster ....
The sober fact seems to be that the American system, with
duality (or worse) built into the conduct of foreign policy,
is unequal to the demands the modern world makes on a
world power. 12
The conclusion is evident. We should retreat from the separation of
powers and invest more unconstrained authority in the Executive.
I sometimes wonder, however, whether American constitutional
reformers yearning after the parliamentary model really appreciate
how that model works. In practice, the fusion of governmental powers means a quite extraordinary concentration of power in the Executive. The British Prime Minister appoints people to office without
parliamentary confirmation, makes foreign policy without parliamentary participation, declares war without parliamentary authorization, concludes treaties without parliamentary ratification, sets the
budget without parliamentary consultation, and withholds information without parliamentary recourse-essentially inheriting the prerogatives that once belonged to absolute monarchy. "The
12. G. Urban,

ENCOUNTER,

Apr. 1987.
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government controls Parliament," as a leading Tory lawyer, Lord
Hailsham, put it, "and not Parliament the government .... We live
under an elective dictatorship, absolute in theory, if hitherto
thought tolerable in practice."' 3 Nor under the British system does
a Supreme Court exist to check executive or legislative abuse.
"It works quite well for us," Sir Oliver Wright, the recent British ambassador to the United States, has written of the parliamentary system. He added: "I doubt it would for you. I'm glad you
didn't try. For the parliamentary system of government gives ...
astonishing power to the executive." This is all right for a mediumsized nation like Britain. "But give the executive of a superpower
...

powers of that magnitude, and we all should be in trouble."'"

American advocates of the parliamentary model reply that there
is an ultimate check under the British system-one that would serve
a useful purpose over here. For in Britain the Executive has automatic legislative support for his policies only so long as those policies command the confidence of a majority in the House of
Commons. The parliamentary system thus appears to offer a quick
and efficient solution when a government commits crimes or blunders or, in one way or another, falls on its face. "If the United States
were a parliamentary democracy," as a writer recently argued in New
Republic, "the Reagan government would have already collapsed in a
'no confidence' vote."' 15
But this assumption also betrays, I fear, an optimistic reading of
the British experience. The last time a vote of confidence overthrew
a government commanding majority support in the House of Commons was over a century ago-in 1885. It is conceivable that something like the Iran-Contra mess might have forced out a British
prime minister through behind-the-scenes sleight-of-hand. This is
what happened when Harold Macmillan replaced Anthony Eden after the Suez fiasco in 1956. But that does not mean that Parliament
and the people would know what had been going on. Details of
Suez are still leaking out a generation later. I remember one British
MP saying to me at the time of Watergate: "Don't think a Watergate
16
couldn't happen here. You just wouldn't hear about it.'
The defects of the British system as a means of guaranteeing
accountability are on full display today. Last year Mrs. Thatcher
13. Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship, LISTENER, Oct. 21, 1976, at 496.
14. Wright, The British View, AM. HERITAGE, May-June 1987, at 92.
15. Kaus, No Confidence, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 23, 1987, at 15.
16. W. Wyatt, TURN AGAIN, WESTMINSTER (1973). The quoted sentiment is from the
author's inscription in my copy of the book.
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made a misbegotten effort to prevent the publication in Australia of
Spycatcher, the book by Peter Wright, a former officer of M15, the
British counter-intelligence agency. The trial brought attention to
Peter Wright's statement that in the 1970s an M15 group had engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow Harold Wilson's Labour government. The M15 gang evidently got into its head that the Prime
Minister might be a Soviet mole and launched a campaign to drive
him out of Downing Street. The book, though published in Australia and now in the United States, is still suppressed in Great Britain,
with Mrs. Thatcher's ukase ratified by Britain's highest court, the
law committee of the House of Lords.
Peter Wright's allegations led to a demand in Parliament for an
investigation to establish the facts. Mrs. Thatcher quickly and definitively quashed the whole idea. "If it was the United States," as Merlyn Rees, a former Home Secretary, cried in frustration, "there
would be a proper investigation. There would be hell to pay. 17
Indeed there would. If an FBI or CIA group had been exposed as
trying to overthrow an American administration, one can imagine
the fury in Congress. There are advantages to the separation of
powers.
Such incidents explain why in Britain constitutional reformers
are calling for movement toward the separation of powers. Ironically, these calls come at just the time that American constitutional
reformers want to move toward the British model.
At any rate, let us concentrate on the harm allegedly wrought in
the United States by the separation of powers. After all, we have
had the checks and balances since the founding of the Republic.
Has it really been such a damaging thing? The existence of an independent Congress and of an independent Supreme Court has not
prevented competent Presidents in the past from acting with decision and dispatch. The separation of powers did not disable Washington or Jefferson or Jackson or Lincoln or Wilson or Truman or
the two Roosevelts. Why is it so much more harmful today?
It cannot be persuasively argued that our problems are so much
worse than those that assailed our ancestors. Troubles impending
always seem worse than troubles surmounted, but this does not
prove that they really are. Nuclear weapons excepted, the problems
of the 1980s are modest compared to the problems that confronted
Washington's generation in achieving independence and fashioning
a free state, or to the problems that confronted Lincoln's generation
17. The Independent (London), Mar. 17, 1987.
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in bringing the Republic through the glare of civil war, or to the
problems that confronted Franklin Roosevelt's generation in conquering the worst depression and winning the greatest war in American history.
Of course, the separation of powers is a perennial irritation for
Presidents. Theodore Roosevelt, when President, once clenched his
fist and said to his young kinsman, Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Sometimes I wish I could be President and Congress too." FDR added
thirty years later, when he was in the White House himself: "I suppose if the truth were told, he is not the only President that has had
that idea."'" But our best Presidents have persevered in the job of
winning consent for their policies. On the whole they have succeeded where they deserved to succeed.
Presidential leadership has historically been the great means of
overcoming the problems created by the separation of powersPresidential leadership, accompanied by the development of political parties that supply the connective tissue between the executive
and legislative branches. The Presidents who operated the system
successfully in the past knew what they thought should be done and
were able to persuade Congress to give their policies a try. The
problem today is not that our leaders have marvelous policies which
they are prevented from carrying out by structural gridlock in the
system. The problem is that they cannot persuade Congress and the
Nation that their policies are wise.
Efficient enactment of a bad program is a doubtful triumph. A
system in which a rubber-stamp legislature delivers whatever the Executive requests is only as good as the Executive and his requests. If
the United States had had a parliamentary system in 1937, Congress
would have given FDR his court-packing plan. If we had a parliamentary system today, Congress would long since have outlawed
abortion and affirmative action and legalized school prayer.
A century ago Lord Bryce reported the English view that the
separation of powers made it impossible for the American system of
government to settle major issues. Bryce also reported the rejoinder that American political leaders made to this criticism. Congress,
they told Bryce, had forborne to settle such issues not because of
defects in the structure of the system
but because the division of opinion in the country regarding them has been faithfully reflected in Congress. The
18. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (S. Rosenmann comp.
1941).
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majority has not been strong enough to get its way; and
this has happened... because no distinct impulse or mandate towards any particular settlement of these questions
has been received from the country. It is not for Congress
to go faster than the people. When the country knows and
speaks its mind, Congress will not fail to act.' 9
The question in short is not failure of structure but failure of
consensus. When the country is not agreed as to what should be
done, then the delay, debate, and further consideration and persuasion enjoined by the separation of powers are likely to produce better policies in the end. What is the great advantage in "making
quick and sharp decisions in the face of urgent problems" if the decisions are also hasty, ill-advised, and dumb? A competent President
with a sensible policy (or even, as with the Reagan tax bill of 1981, a
less than sensible policy) has the resources under the present Constitution to get his way.
The separation of powers is deplored most in the area of foreign policy. Yet here, above all, it is the indispensable engine of
consent; and consent is never more indispensable than on questions
of peace and war. The framers saw foreign policy not as the exclusive possession of the President, but as a power shared with Congress; indeed, they saw Congress as the senior partner. For they
gave Congress not only the exclusive appropriations power 2°-itself
a potent instrument of control-but the exclusive power to declare
war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to
make rules for the government and regulation of the armed services
and to grant letters of marque and reprisal 2 1-this last provision
representing the eighteenth century equivalent of retaliatory strikes
and enabling Congress to authorize limited as well as formal war.
The constitutional convention had no stronger champion of executive energy than Alexander Hamilton. But it was Hamilton who
wrote in The Federalist No. 75:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in
a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous
a kind as those which concern its intercourse with the rest
of the world to the sole disposal of ... a President of the
United States. 2
19. 1 J. BRYCE, supra note 4, at 147-48.
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
21. Id.at cls. II & 13.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 505-06 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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Congressional criticism alerts a President to flaws in his policies. Congressional support strengthens his hand and increases his
authority. And of course it is a delusion-sedulously encouraged by
Presidents-that they are necessarily wise or even better informed
than Congress. Which body made more sense about the Vietnam
War twenty years ago-the National Security Council or the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee? Which body makes more sense about
Iran and Nicaragua today?
Still, is there not a genuine need for executive secrecy? Of
course there is: weapons systems and deployments; negotiating
plans and positions; and intelligence methods and sources are
among the fields where secrecy is indispensable. But secrecy is also
a source of power, a guarantee of the abuse of power, and a convenient means of covering up the embarrassments, blunders, follies,
and crimes of the ruling regime. In a democracy the presumption
must always be against executive secrecy, even if that presumption
cannot always control.
Still, what about the argument that in our own dangerous age
the United States for protection and survival must use "those unconventional tools which great powers have always had to use in a
cruel world"-especially 'covert action,' the effort through clandestine means to change policies and regimes in other countries? Now
as one who served as an intelligence officer in the Office of Strategic
Services during World War II, I am well aware that covert action has
its uses. I am also well aware of the limitations of covert action,
especially in peacetime, and of the problems it creates for democratic government. For covert action is at best a marginal instrument of policy. Its importance in the conduct of foreign affairs is
greatly overrated. Moreover, the very term is a misnomer. Covert
action is often easy to detect, always hard to control, and in its nature illegal and immune to normal procedures of accountability.
Founded as it is on law-breaking, deception, and lies, covert action
imports bad habits into a democratic polity.
In January 1961 President Eisenhower's Board of Consultants
on Foreign Intelligence Activities, after a review of the CIA record,
told the President, "We have been unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert action programs undertaken by the CIA up to
this time have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources involved." 3 Nothing the CIA

23.

BOARD OF CONSULTANTS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. REPORT TO PRESI-
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has done in the quarter-century since gives reason to alter this considered verdict.
I would advise a skeptical attitude toward covert action. As
Congressman Lee Hamilton has wisely said: "The U.S. government
should not carry out any covert action that a fully-informed American public would not support. While occasionally necessary, it
should not be the preferred tool of foreign policy."'2 4 Covert action
has become a means by which Presidents escape the constitutional
system of accountability. This is unacceptable. In my view, covert
action should be reserved for only the most acute and demonstrable
national emergencies. It should never be a routine instrument of
foreign policy.
I am interested to note that this thought belatedly dawned upon
Robert C. McFarlane, the former National Security Adviser, as he
prepared for the Iran-Contra hearings. "It was clearly unwise," McFarlane told Congress, "to rely on covert activity as the core of our
policy .... You must have the American people and the U.S. Congress solidly behind you. Yet it is virtually impossible, almost as a
matter of definition, to rally public support behind a policy that you
2 5

can't even talk about."

Presidents should regard the requirement of congressional collaboration in foreign affairs not as a burden from which to be delivered but as an opportunity to be embraced in order to give their
policies a solid basis in consent. As our wisest diplomat of the century, Averell Harriman, once put it: "No foreign policy will stick
unless the American people are behind it. And unless Congress un'26
derstands it, the American people aren't going to understand it."

The separation of powers has caused its share of problems, but
in the main it has worked well enough. It has ensured discussion
when no consensus exists for action and permitted action when a
majority is convinced that the proposed action is right. In other
words, if the Executive has a persuasive policy, he doesn't require
more authority than he enjoys under the existing Constitution. If
the Executive's remedy is not persuasive, he shouldn't be given the
authority to put his policies into immediate effect.
DENT EISENHOWER (Jan.

5, 1961), quoted in A.

SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND

His

457-58 (1978).
24. Hamilton, The Trouble with Covert Action, Wash. Post. Aug. 17, 1986.

TIMES

25. McFarlane Under Oath: He Charts a Plunge Into Paralysis, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987,
at A i2, col. 1.
26. Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judieialy Comm., 92d Cong., I st Sess. 360

(1971).
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But the greatest importance of the separation of powers lies
precisely in the old theory of the founding fathers-to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The separation of powers is the vital
means of self-correction in our system. It is the means of protection
against the resurgence of the "imperial Presidency." It is the ultimate guarantee of the system of accountability.
We Americans go back and forth on the question of Presidential
power. Only a few years ago our concern was over the weakness of
the Presidency. The impression arose of a beleaguered and impotent fellow sitting forlornly in the Oval Office; assailed by unprecedentedly intractable problems; paralyzed by the constitutional
separation of powers; hemmed in by congressional and bureaucratic
constraints; pushed one way or another by exigent special interest
groups; and seduced, betrayed, and abandoned by the mass media.
The once mighty American Presidency appeared tied down, like
Gulliver, by a web of debilitating statutory and political bonds. Pundits predicted an age of one-term Presidents. In 1980 ex-President
Ford said to general applause: "We have not an imperial presidency
but an imperilled presidency.''27
By the late 1980s concern shifted back from the fear of Presidential weakness to the abuse of Presidential power. President Reagan quickly demonstrated in his first term that the Presidency was
far from an impotent or insolvent office. Contrary to the predictions
of the late 1970s, he won easy re-election to a second term. The
congressional reclamation of power after Watergate turned out to
be largely make-believe. The War Powers Resolution2" had no effect in restraining Presidents from sending troops into combat,
whether in Lebanon or in Grenada or in Libya or in the Persian
Gulf. Reagan brought the CIA back from its season of disgrace,
made it once again the President's private army, and sent it off, without congressional approval-indeed in contravention of laws passed
by Congress-to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.
In order to escape the CIA's nominal obligation to report its
dark deeds to congressional oversight committees, Reagan converted the National Security Council, heretofore a policy-coordination body, into an operating agency and permitted it to indulge in
the now notorious Iran-Contra flimflam. Having placed the integrity and credibility of the United States in the hands of Middle Eastern confidence men, the administration made exposure inevitable.
27. Ford, Imperiled, Not Imperial, TIME, Nov. 10, 1980, at 30.
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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When the inevitable exposure began, the administration took refuge
in a bluster of incomplete, misleading and, on occasion, false accounts of what its members had wrought. In the meantime, the
scheme violated not only elementary standards of intelligence and
responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs but very likely also the
Export Administration Act; 9 the Arms Export Control Act;" ° the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986;"' the
33
National Security Act, 3 2 including the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
and the Boland Amendment;3 4 the Neutrality Act; 35 and, with the
destruction of documents, the Official Records Act 36 and the Presidential Records Act.3 7
The issue raised here is hardly complicated. The issue is this:
is the President of the United States above the laws and the Constitution? On inauguration day every President solemnly swears that
he "will faithfully execute the Office of the President of the United
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. ' '38 The Constitution further and explicitly commands that the President shall "take care that
3' 9
the Laws be faithfully executed."
The report by the Tower Commission leaves little doubt that
the Presidential oath and the constitutional command have been violated by the Reagan administration. The report reads:
Throughout the Iran initiative, significant questions of law
do not appear to have been adequately addressed ....
There appears to have been . .. little attention, let alone
systematic analysis, devoted to how Presidential actions
would comply with U.S. law.40
In the only known White House legal analysis of the Boland Amendment, the job was assigned to a lawyer who had failed his bar exami29. 7 U.S.C. § 1732; 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778, 3108; 26 U.S.C. § 993; 42 U.S.C. § 6212,
6274; 50 U.S.C. App. 88 2401-2413 (1982 & Supp. I 1985).
30. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2382, 2392, 2394, 2403, 2751-2796c (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
31. Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (1986) (codified at scattered sections of 2, 5,
10, 18, 22, 36, 37, 38, 42, 46, and 50 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)).
32. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
33. Id. at § 413.
34. Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982) (Boland Amendment).
35. 22 U.S.C. §§ 441-465 (1982).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982).
37. 44 U.S.C. §§ 101 note, 2107-2108, 2201-2207 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
39. Id. at § 3.
40. Report of the President's Special Review Board at IV-9 (1987) [hereinafter Tower Commission Report].
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nation four times and who immediately pronounced Colonel
North's activities legal. 4 The White House never asked the Department of Justice for an opinion on the constitutionality or scope of
the Boland Amendment.4 2
An especially pernicious device, unknown to the Constitution
and very far indeed from the original intent about which the Attorney General lectures us so often, is the so-called Intelligence Finding. This device has its statutory base in the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment of 1974"3 and the Intelligence Oversight Act.4 4 The
legislation empowers the President to order a covert action if he
finds the action "important to the national security of the United
States." 4 5 The law further requires, however, "a report to the Congress... concerning any finding or determination under any section
46
of this chapter."
But in the celebrated Finding ofJanuary 17, 1986, the President
"found" that selling arms to Iran was important to the national security and found also that the Finding should be kept secret from
the congressional intelligence committees that the law obligated
him to inform. The Tower Commission reproduces the Finding,
which included this arresting sentence: "I ... direct the Director of
Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the
47
Congress.'
This is not a government of laws. It is a government of decrees-and secret decrees at that. Still worse, President Reagan
kept the Finding secret not only from Congress but from his own
Secretaries of State and Defense. Worst of all, the Finding was
presented to him under cover of a memorandum from Admiral
Poindexter explaining what it was all about; but as the President
himself confessed, without, it must be said, great shame, "though he
was briefed on the contents of the memorandum.., he did not read
it." ' 48 This is an old Hollywood habit. When a well-known film producer, who was contemplating a film based on Henry James's The

41. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, at AI, col. 2.
42. Meese Tells Panel He Had No Reason to Press Inquiny, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1987, at
A l, col. 2.
43. 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982).
44. National Security Act § 501(a), 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (1982).
45. 22 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (1982).
46. Id. at § 2414(a). But see Cooper, Comment, 47 MD. L. REV. 84, 87-88 (1987) (questioning Professor Schlesinger's invocation of this statute).
47. Tower Commission Report, supra note 40, at B-60.
48. Id. at B-65.
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Wings of a Dove, was asked whether he had read the book, he answered, "Well, not personally."
Such abuse of the Intelligence Finding offers a negligent or unscrupulous President a way of secretly and unilaterally violating the
law. As employed by President Reagan this device is a blow to the
system of accountability and to the balance of the Constitution.
President Reagan tried in August 1986 to deal with the problem
by an announcement of new procedures he promised to follow when
informing Congress about covert operations. This is not enough.
Congress should enact the bill, already proposed by Representative
Louis Stokes, Chairman of the House Select Intelligence Committee, which would require that all Presidential Findings be put in
writing and be sent within forty-eight hours to the statutory members of the National Security Council and to the chairmen of the
intelligence committees. The bill should also contain a provision,
not in the bill at present, imposing criminal penalties in case of violation. Similar penalties should be imposed for executive violations
of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, the Boland Amendment, and the
other laws listed earlier. One reason why the Administration has
violated these laws with impunity is that violation incurs no
punishment.
The euphoria induced by the large margin of re-election victory
in 1984 seems to have loosened the Presidential grasp on reality.
Reagan and his White House staff evidently supposed that the election sweep empowered them to do whatever they thought necessary
for the safety of the Republic without regard to obligations imposed
by the Constitution or by the statute book. They considered secrecy
an all-embracing Presidential entitlement, even when its purpose
was to escape the accountability that is the essence of the constitutional system. The Reagan Presidency has upset the constitutional
balance between Presidential power and Presidential accountability.
This subversion of the democratic process has provoked the
movement we see today to restore the constitutional balance. The
reaction against executive usurpation is already, as it did after
Watergate, provoking a counter-reaction. We are beginning to hear
again that the Presidency itself is in danger. We are told once more
that too zealous an inquiry into executive abuses will cripple the
Presidential office. The prospect of a fifth consecutive failed Presidency is leading some to conclude that the fatal flaw lies not in the
individuals occupying the office but in the office itself. I beg you not
to be unduly impressed by these gloomy apprehensions.
When an administration's conduct of foreign affairs is incoher-

1987]

THE CONSTITUTION AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP

69

ent, incompetent, duplicitous, and dedicated to rash and mindless
policies, what is so terrible about a crippled Presidency? Surely a
crippled Presidency is far better for the Nation (and the world) than
an unrepentant and unchastened one. Would we really be better off
today if Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North were still running
our foreign policy? Would we be better off if we continued to conduct our foreign policy on the principle that a patriotic end justifies
unconstitutional means-that, so long as a government official
claims patriotic motives, he can lie, cheat, and evade law and Constitution at will? One is uncomfortably reminded of President Reagan's observation at his first press conference: "[T]he only morality
they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve
unto themselves the right to commit any crime; to lie; to cheat, in
order to obtain that (and that is moral, not immoral)." 4 9 Only President Reagan was talking about the Soviet Union, not about his own
subordinates.
Nor does the crippling of a President who does foolish or criminal things mean a crippling of the Presidential office. The reaction
against Watergate did not prevent Reagan from having a relatively
successful first term, nor would it have handicapped Ford and
Carter had they been more competent in the job.
Nor can one conclude from another failed Presidency that there
is something basically wrong with the system. The Constitution has
never pretended to guarantee against Presidential incompetence,
folly, stupidity, or criminality. As the Supreme Court once said in a
celebrated decision, the Republic has "no right to expect that it will
always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with
hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln." 50
The Constitution cannot guarantee against such problems. But,
through the principle of the separation of powers, it can guarantee
that, when a President abuses power, corrective forces exist to redress the constitutional balance. As Senator Sam Ervin remarked
during the Watergate days: "One of the great advantages of the
three separate branches of government is that it's difficult to corrupt
all three at the same time."'" The press, as a de facto fourth branch,
serves as a powerful reinforcement of the corrective process.
49. Transcript of President's First Nvews Conference on Foreign and Domestic Topics. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 1981, at AI0, col. 2.
50. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866).
51. J. BLUM, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 862 (6th ed. 1985).
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The issue is not the Rube Goldberg scheme to get the Ayatollah
to subsidize the Contras, nor even its Inspector Clouseau mode of
execution. The issue is whether the President of the United States is
above the Constitution and the laws.
This is not a new issue. The notion that the sovereign can do
no wrong has been the premise of many legal systems in earlier
times. Our own polity has not always been immune to this dangerous idea. As Richard Nixon once inimitably put it, "[W]hen the
President does it, that means that it is not illegal."'52 Emanations
from the White House suggest that President Reagan shares this
dangerous delusion. Laws passed by Congress, the President's
spokesman said on May 14, 1987, cannot limit "the constitutional
and historical power of the President to set and implement foreign
policy." 5 3 The Boland Amendment, it is argued, did not apply to
the President, and, if it did, it would be unconstitutional.
This administration talks a good deal about what the Attorney
General calls the 'jurisprudence of original intention. '5 4 But when
it comes to Presidential power in warmaking and in foreign policy
generally, it tramples the original intent of the framers underfoot.
The framers explicitly rejected the idea that the President owned
American foreign policy. As Hamilton emphasized, foreign policy
was definitely not committed to the "sole disposal" of the President.5 5 The men at Philadelphia, wrote Lincoln, "resolved to so
frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of
bringing" the Republic into war.5 6 And the basic answer to the idea
that the sovereign can do no wrong-to the doctrine of the divine
right of Presidents-is an old one, going back in spirit to the Magna
Carta. Justice Jackson put it memorably in the Steel Seizure Case:
"With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that
the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parlia57
mentary deliberation."
52. Interview of Richard Nixon by David Frost (May 19, 1977).
53. Aide Cites Reagan Foreign Policy Power, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1987, at A13, col. 4.
54. Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S.
TEX. LJ.455, 464 (1986) (reprinting a speech delivered to the American Bar Association in Washington, D.C. on July 9, 1985).
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 504-06 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
56. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848), reprintedin

I

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

1824-1848, at 451-52 (R. Basler ed.

1953).
57. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J..
concurring).

1987]

THE CONSTITUTION AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP

71

The present reaction against Reagan's excesses is evidence of
the determination of the American people to defend the rule of law.
It is an admonition to future Presidents to respect the oath they take
at their inauguration to execute the office faithfully and to preserve
and protect the Constitution. It is not a failure but a vindication of
American democracy.
I remember the English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper explaining Watergate to a British audience by comparing it with the revolt
against royal prerogative in seventeenth-century England. When
Hampden refused to pay ship money in 1636, the real issue went far
beyond ship money to the Crown's claim to absolute power. Foreigners wondered why the English made such a fuss about ship
money when an unhampered English foreign policy might have
been so effective in Europe. "But the English," Trevor-Roper
wrote, "thought first of their own liberties; and who shall say that
they were wrong?" 5 8
Nor need anyone fear that the recurrent uproar against the imperial Presidency will inflict permanent damage on the office. The
American Presidency, I assure you, is indestructible. This is partly
so for functional reasons. The separation of powers among three
coordinate branches of government creates an inherent tendency
toward inertia and stalemate. One of the three branches must take
the initiative if the system is to move. The executive branch alone is
structurally capable of taking that initiative. The men who framed
the Constitution intended that it should do so. "Energy in the executive," Alexander Hamilton wrote in The FederalistNo. 70, "is a leading character in the definition of good government"59-executive
energy always within the Constitution.
Moreover, the growth of Presidential initiative has resulted less
from Presidential rapacity for power than from the necessities of
governing an ever more complex society. As the tiny agricultural
country turned into the mighty world power, the problems assailing
the national polity increased vastly in number, size, and urgency.
Most of these problems could not be tackled without vigorous executive leadership. Throughout American history, a strong Presidency has kept the system in motion. The President remains, as
Woodrow Wilson once said, "the only national voice" and the Presidency "the vital place of action in the system.''60
58. Trevor-Roper, Wy'on-Americas Charles I?, SPECTATOR, Aug. 11, 1973, at 177.
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
60. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 68. 73 (1908).
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A third reason for the indestructibility of the Presidency lies in
the psychology of mass democracy. Here De Tocqueville provides
the text. "Our contemporaries," he wrote, "are constantly excited
by two conflicting passions: they want to be led, and they wish to
remain free .... By this system the people shake off their dependency just long enough to select their master and then relapse into
it again."'" Americans have always had considerable ambivalence
about the Presidency. One year we denounce Presidential despotism. The next we demand Presidential leadership. While we are
quite proficient at cursing out Presidents-a proficiency that helps
keep the system in balance-we also have a profound longing to believe in and admire them. Reagan's success in his first term expressed a widespread national 'desire for a President to succeed,
even when he proposed policies that made little sense and to which
in many cases, if public opinion polls can be believed, a majority of
Americans were opposed.
The Presidency will survive. Its mighty powers lie ready to be
mobilized by any leader prepared to operate within the Constitution
and to persuade Congress that the course is right. But when Presidents abuse their powers, they can expect retribution, even when it
causes a temporary impasse in foreign policy. Americans think first
of their own liberties, and who shall say that they are wrong?
Still, a last question must be considered: what leads American
Presidents into the imperial temptation? Can we expect reversions
to the imperial Presidency in the future? We have already noted
that the Constitution cannot insure against wicked men filling the
place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln. But what is it in
recent times that lures Presidents who are not wicked men into
abusing their power? The answer, I judge, lies not in the structure
of polity but in the purpose of policy.
For in recent times the United States has been subject to periodic delusions that we Americans have been designated by the Almighty to redeem fallen humanity. The real question is whether a
messianic foreign policy is compatible with our Constitution. I think
not. When an American President conceives himself as the appointed savior of a world in which mortal danger requires a rapid
and incessant deployment of men, weapons, and decisions behind a
wall of secrecy, power rushes from Capitol Hill to the White House.
This is not to say that the American Constitution is a mandate
for isolationism. It has always sustained the weight of a responsible
61. A.
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(R. Heffner ed. 1956).
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and discriminating internationalism, addressed to the historic interests of the United States, committed only to regions of the world
where American intervention is locally sought and can be locally effective. A vainglorious foreign policy, however, aimed at the salvation of the world, relying on secret actions and duplicitous methods,
and involving the United States in useless wars and grandiose
dreams is something very different.
So long as we have a messianic foreign policy, any President will
be tempted to develop capabilities for secrecy, disinformation (i.e.,
lying), covert action, and armed violence that are incompatible with
the Constitution of 1787 and that would undermine and nullify the
separation of powers. Our present Constitution will buckle under
the weight of an indiscriminate globalism that sees everywhere on
earth interests and threats demanding immediate and often concealed American commitment and action. It is hard to reconcile the
separation of powers with a foreign policy animated by an indignant
ideology and marked by an eagerness to intervene speedily, unilaterally, and secretly in the affairs of other states. This vision of the
American role in the world unbalances and overwhelms the American Constitution.
If such a foreign policy is essential to the future of the United
States, then the United States must have a new Constitution. But I
do not think that we need abandon that noble document. If a messianic foreign policy bursts the limits and destroys the balance of the
Constitution, then the wisdom of the framers is even greater than
one could have imagined. So vainglorious a foreign policy is hopeless on its merits. It is beyond our wisdom to conceive and beyond
our power to execute. It can only bring disaster to the Republic. As
President Kennedy said in November 1961:
[W]e must face the fact that the United States is neither
omnipotent nor omniscient-that we are only 6 percent of
the world's population-that we cannot impose our will
upon the other 94 percent of mankind-that we cannot
right every wrong or reverse each adversity-and that
therefore there cannot be an American solution to every
world problem.6 2
The American Constitution is not a straitjacket. It is a document, as ChiefJustice Marshall said, "intended to endure for ages to
62. Address by President John F. Kennedy at the University of Washington's 100th
Anniversary Program in Seattle, Washington (Nov. 16, 1961), reprintled in PUB. PAPERS
726 (1962).
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come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." 6 3 It has proved equal to worse crises than any we face today, and there seems no reason to alter its basic structure now. It
provides ample opportunity for Presidents to make their case to
Congress and the Nation and to win the consent necessary to put
wise policies into effect. The separation of powers no doubt makes
for continuing struggle, but in that struggle the advantage will lie
with the President so long as he respects the Constitution and the
laws and so long as his policies command general assent.
The Constitution, in short, is a challenge to Presidential leadership. It is a test of a President's capacity to persuade Congress and
the people that his policies make sense. For ours is a government
based on consent, and any President who seeks to attain his purposes through secrecy or deceit defies and undermines the constitutional order. Fortunately, the separation of powers provides the
means by which the system can correct its abuses. When a President
embarks on reckless policies in defiance of the Constitution and the
laws, he can expect precisely what is happening to President Reagan
today.
No one at home or abroad should be upset for a moment by the
national determination to redress the balance of the Constitution.
Americans should feel proud, not apprehensive or apologetic, about
the present reaction against Presidential excess. That reaction indeed represents a stirring and momentous vindication of American
democracy. We may all rejoice in this bicentennial year at this latest
proof of the health and vitality of the American Constitution.

63. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).

